Plone's iCalendar and RSS-portlet imports both let a logged-in editor take the site down, SSRF the internal network, and plant stored XSS
Two independent Plone advisories share the exact same failure shape: importing attacker-influenced content — an iCalendar file via plone.app.event, or a feed URL via plone.app.portlets' RSS portlet — lets any logged-in editor point Plone at an oversized file or feed, exhausting memory to take the whole site offline, probe the internal network and open ports (SSRF), and inject stored XSS through crafted URL/javascript: fields (CVE-2026-55247, CVE-2026-55248). Neither needs admin rights, just the routine editor-level ability to import an event or add a portlet — the portlets advisory explicitly calls out the event one as the same bug shape. Patch plone.app.event to 6.0.1/5.2.4 and plone.app.portlets to 7.0.2/6.0.4/5.0.8, and until then restrict iCal-import and manage-portlets permissions to Manager/Site Administrator only.