https://vanemmerik.ai/supply-chain/ Supply Chain Watch entries: GitHub Actions. en https://vanemmerik.ai/supply-chain/2026-10-24/#litellm-root-cause-leaked-master-key vea-sc-2026-10-24-litellm-root-cause-leaked-master-key Sat, 24 Oct 2026 16:01:00 +0000 LiteLLM's Oct 23 write-up says a master key for its Agent Platform was committed to a public repo in May and never revoked. On Oct 10 the attacker used it to pull an org owner's unscoped GitHub CLI token, then ran throwaway CI branches that shipped repository secrets to a webhook, yielding two more maintainer tokens; the owner token overrode branch protection to point the Oct 21 release at a lookalike fork. Socket separately found two successful secret-stealing cache.yml runs on Oct 10 and Oct 12 (branches ci-tmp-a351cc and ci-tmp-4d8517) targeting 20 secrets, including AI provider keys and a GitHub App private key. This corrects LiteLLM's earlier theory that a token leaked through internal logs. Affected artifacts are unchanged: only 1.107.0 on PyPI and its Docker images; LiteLLM says it is revoking every token and key. What to do: If 1.107.0 ever ran, the earlier guidance stands: rebuild, pin 1.106.2 and rotate. For your own org, revoke keys that were ever committed (even if force-pushed away) and alert on workflow files appearing on short-lived branches.